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Plant Closure Legislation in the United
States: Insights from Great Britain
I. INTRODUCTION
In a letter to a Congressional Joint Hearing in 1980 on the topic
of plant closures,' Mr. William Silveira illustrated the harsh realities
an individual employee faces when his or her workplace is perma-
nently shut down:
To whom it may concern:
I'm just writing this letter to let you know that the General Elec-
tric Plant at 1034 66th Ave. in Oakland is planning to shut down
for good. I have been there 22 years going on 23 years. If they
close this plant down it will be tough for me to find a job at my age.
I am 52 years old and in my health and condition, I am under a
doctor's care for high blood pressure. All my medical insurance is
with General Electric. If this plant closes I will have to pay all my
medical bill [sic] on my own. If I'm lucky to find a job and jobs are
hard to find and the way medical costs are nowaday [sic] that will
be very hard for me to do. My life insurance and my pension are
also with General Electric. And I will lose that also. I have a wife
to support and a home to pay for not to mention taxes and every-
thing else that goes with buying a home. This plant employs
mostly low income and a lot of minority people so I'm not the only
one that it will hurt. It will put a lot of people out of work that
really need it. Its [sic] just not for me but for my fellow employees
who I work with. All most [sic] half my life has been with GE. I
would appreciate any help you can give us to convince the General
Electric Company to keep this plant open and keep me and my
employer at this plant instead of on the street looking for work that
ain't there. One more thing their [sic] not loseing [sic] money.
They sponsored the Johnny Carson Show and other T.V. shows.
They spend enough on these shows to keep the Oakland plant open
1. Plant closings/closures will be defined in this Comment as including partial and total
plant shutdowns and/or relocations, as well as any economic dislocations that affect workers,
local economies, local and federal governments, and local communities. See Millspaugh, The
Campaign for Plant Closing Laws in the United States: An Assessment, 5 CORP. L. REV. 291
(1982).
278 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 8:277
for 3 more years or longer. Thank you for reading my letter. It




Since the early 1970's, the number of plant shutdowns and em-
ployee dismissals in the United States has risen at an alarming rate.3
The devastating effects these closures have on workers, their families,
and their communities are well documented. 4 In order to best show
how to alleviate plant closure problems, this Comment will compare
the general policy approaches taken in both the United States and
Great Britain. It will also address specific features of proposed and
enacted legislation concerning plant closures and their effects in the
two countries. Finally, this Comment will show that if legislation ad-
dressing the problems of plant closure is to be enacted, it must pro-
vide a balanced and effective solution which integrates government,
business, and labor.
A. The Economic and Social Cost of Plant Closures5
When workers become unemployed as a result of a plant shut-
2. National Employment Priorities Act, 1979: Hearings on H.R. 5040 Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 137-38 (1981) (Letter of
William Silveira) (Hearing held in Martinez, California) [hereinafter cited as Hearings-
Martinez].
3. For example, from 1969-1976, studies have revealed that more than 6500 plants with
100 or more workers have shut down. Moreover, one of every three American firms that em-
ployed between 100 and 500 workers in 1969, and one of every four firms that employed over
500 workers, were no longer in existence in 1976. Kay & Griffin, Plant Closures. Assessing the
Victims'Remedies, 19 WILLAMETTE L.J. 199, 201 (1983) (citing D. BIRCH, THE JOB GENER-
ATION PROCESS 12 (1979)). See B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNI-
TIES: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT (1980). See also R.
MCKENZIE, PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES? (1982).
4. An analysis of the problems that create plant closures would be an enormous task,
practically untreatable in a discussion such as this one. Therefore, this Comment focuses on
the problems created by plant closures and the possible legislative solutions to those problems,
rather than discussing in any detail the possible causes of plant closures.
5. As stated in one legislative report on plant closures, less skilled, older, long term
"blue collar" employees tend to suffer the most adverse effects because these workers' skills
"tend to be more job specific than white collar employees' skills." As a consequence,
employees that share some or all of these characteristics often have less success finding
subsequent employment because they frequently are less adaptable and less marketable due to
the specific and often limited nature of their skills. Legislative Research Council of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Report Relative to Plant Closings 29 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Massachusetts Report]; moreover, blacks, latinos, Asians, and women tend to be hit
hardest when a plant shuts down because minorities frequently are "the last hired, first fired."
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down, they suffer not only an immediate and abrupt loss in earnings,
but also a loss of medical and retirement benefits. 6 Those workers
who, up until they were laid-off, were the sole or primary breadwin-
ners for their families, may also suffer psychological problems due to
the frustration and helplessness they feel because they can no longer
fulfill the needs of their families. 7 Communities also suffer when a
significant number of the population rely on one employer and that
employer closes its plant.8 For example, in such communities, the
intake of tax revenues declines dramatically, and the unemployed
workers now need governmental assistance. 9 Other businesses that
rely on a solvent community for their revenues also suffer when a
significant number of people become unemployed.10 Thus, a plant
Zimmerman, International Runaway Shop: Why U.S. Companies Are Moving Their Plants
Abroad, UNITED FRONT PRESS, Dec. 1972, at 49.
6. Massachusetts Report, supra note 5.
7. As shown by one legislative study:
Loss of work network removes an important source of human support. As a result,
psychosomatic illnesses, anxiety, worry, tension, impaired interpersonal relations and
an increased sense of powerlessness arise. As self esteem decreases, problems of alco-
holism, child and spouse abuse and aggression increase . . . . Other devastating
consequences are the severe physical problems many displaced workers experience.
Among the medical problems that have been found to be associated with plant shut-
downs are sleeplessness, hypertension, ulcers, increased uric acid, and high choles-
terol levels.
Massachusetts Report, supra note 5, at 30. The same report, citing another study, pointed out
that suicide rates among displaced employees can reach as high as thirty times the average
rate. Id. (citing Strange, Job Loss: A Psychosocial Study of Worker Reactions to a Plant Clos-
ing in a Company Town in Southern Appalachia, NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SER-
VICE 38 (1977)).
8. Massachusetts Report, supra note 5, at 31.
9. The higher the percentage of the community that becomes unemployed as a result of
a shutdown, the lower the community's tax revenues. Yet, the more unemployed there are, the
higher the tax revenues must be to pay increased unemployment insurance and other social
welfare payments. Thus, at the same time the need and demand for unemployment benefits
and welfare payments are increasing, tax revenues are declining. Lower tax revenue also con-
tributes to a deterioration in the local services received by everyone in the community. These
problems are aggravated where unemployment in the community continues for a long period
of time. Massachusetts Report, supra note 5, at 31.
10. For example, in California, in 1981, 1982, and the first quarter of 1983, 1,484 plants
were closed resulting in the direct loss of 165,843 jobs. However, for every direct job lost, 1.6
jobs were indirectly lost, making the total direct and indirect job loss for plant closures roughly
430,000. National Employment Priorities Act, 1983: Hearings on HR. 2847 Before the Sub-
comm. on Employment Opportunities and the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1983) (Hearing held in
Los Angeles, California) (statement of Jim Quillan, President, California Conference of Ma-
chinists) [hereinafter cited as Hearings-Los Angeles]. Mr. Quillan cited research done by the
University of California, Berkeley Department of Planning and Public Research as the source
for his statistical information. Nationwide, in the automobile industry, it has been found that
for every job directly lost, 2.4 to 3.0 jobs are indirectly lost. Massachusetts Report, supra note
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closing can adversely affect not only the individual worker, his or her
family, and the local community, but also the economic livelihood of
subsidiary and ancillary businesses and their employees.
B. Causation and Possible Solutions of Plant Closures
These problems faced by unemployed workers are often not the
result of the plant closure itself, but rather due to the abruptness of
that closure. For instance, when a worker is given only two weeks
notice, she or he does not have time to find or train for another job.
Thus, when the closure occurs, there is an immediate stop in income.
In such a situation, the only remedy may be for the employer to give
notice much sooner in order to allow time for employees to adjust."
However, therein lies the real problem. In the United States today,
there is no way to compel an employer to structure a concededly nec-
essary plant closure so as to minimize the injury to the employees. 12
When a company wants or needs to shut a plant or factory, it may do
so at its discretion without consulting any of those people who will be
hurt by its decision.13
5, at 32 (citing MacLennan & O'Donnell, The Effects of the Automotive Transition on Employ-
ment, A Plant and Community Study, U.S. Dep't of Transp. (1980)).
11. Although, according to Rep. William D. Ford, advance notice does not solve or even
attempt to solve all of the serious problems caused by a plant closure,
[i]t will provide time for individual employees and their families to begin searching
for new employment or training, to begin adjusting their budgets for the income loss
they will sustain, and for government agencies to begin planning the delivery of ad-
justment services. It is not just humane; it is economically efficient for society to
require some minimal amount of advance notice before employers terminate large
groups of employees.
Ford, Coping with Plant Closings, 36 LAB. L.J. 323-24 (1985).
12. As illustrated by Professor Bennett Harrison:
In sharp contrast to the European situation, only about one in five workers in the
United States is covered by collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, of those
workers who do belong to unions, only a small proportion have contracts containing
language providing more than token advance notification of shutdowns. Of all col-
lective bargaining agreements in force in 1980 and covering more than 1,000 employ-
ees, only 15 percent contained language requiring either advance notice of a closure
or relocation, or explicitly authorizing union participation in the procedure. Of the
contracts containing such language, 3 of 4 were in manufacturing, so service workers
(the fastest growing segment of the economy) were especially poorly protected. And
of those agreements reporting (to the Bureau of Labor Statistics) on length of the pre-
notification period, more than half provided less than 3 months' notice, while only 14
percent called for pre-notification of 6 months or more.
Harrison, Plant closures: efforts to cushion the blow, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June, 1984, at 41
(U.S. Dep't of Labor publication).
13. According to a United States Supreme Court decision in June 1981, the Court held
that an employer could close a plant without bargaining at all with an affected union, provided
that the shutdown is a partial one (i.e., one of several plants in a multi-unit company) made for
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The plight of workers, who have no control over the future of
their employment, is the result of their lack of economic power rela-
tive to their employers. '4 Labor unions are one way of shifting this
balance of power, but the vast majority of employees are not members
of unions. 15 Another way of giving some of this power to employees
is through legislation. Legislation, however, requires the support of
politicians, who have among their constituents employers as well as
employees. 16 These politicians are lobbied hard by both labor and
management groups; a middle ground often does not exist. Because
of the traditional antagonism between labor and management, the two
sides seldom appear willing to handle mutual problems through
compromise. 17
Congress has recently contemplated adopting a comprehensive
industrial policy which would provide guidelines for cooperation
among business, government, and labor to deal effectively with such
issues as industrial innovation, economic growth, international com-
petitiveness, and research and development.' 8 More importantly, a
framework for cooperation between government, business, and labor,
economic reasons-as opposed to anti-union motivations. Id. (citing First National Mainte-
nance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981)).
14. See supra note 12.
15. See supra note 12.
16. Therefore, as a result, public policies have tended to fall principally into two catego-
ries: "misguided business incentives and supports enacted by state and local governments in a
frantic effort to attract or hold capital; and a few inadequate welfare-type policies for dislo-
cated workers." B. BLUESTONE, B. HARRISON & BAKER, CORPORATE FLIGHT: THE CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC DISLOCATION 65 (1981).
17. Rep. William Clay, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations,
stated that in the area of plant closures:
It is frustrating to say the least, that while the problem has intensified since our last
hearing here in 1980, progress toward a solution has not gotten very far. Workers
continue to be displaced at an increasing and alarming rate. Local communities con-
tinue to compete with each other to attract new industry and then stand by helplessly
when a corporation decides to leave after milking the local economy, leaving those
who remain devastated.
Hearings-Los Angeles, supra note 10, at 64.
18. Schacht, Industrial Innovation: The Debate over Government Policy 4 (1984) (Con-
gressional Research Service Issue Brief No. IB 89004 available from the Library of Congress).
According to a Harvard Business Review report:
The success of collaborative business-government relations in places such as Japan
has led to even stronger proposals for direct intervention by government in business
affairs-that is, for an American industrial policy that would create new institutional
arrangements between companies and government and new policies to rehabilitate
American economic performance.
Public Policy and Private Enterprise, HARV. Bus. REV. v-vi (1983) (quoting from preface to
the volume) [hereinafter cited as Public Policy].
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whether labeled a "social contract"'19 or a comprehensive "industrial
policy," could provide guidelines for designing and implementing spe-
cific solutions to the problems created by plant closures.2o
The proposed federal solutions to date have been soundly criti-
cized by some observers who think that they disproportionately favor
employees. 21 These observers, most of whom have interests in busi-
ness as employers, argue that this imbalance is the result of too little
input from those representing their interests during the proposals'
drafting stages.22 Thus, if any comprehensive legislation concerning
plant closures is to be implemented and supported by all sectors of
industry and government, compromises must be made by each side.
C. Lessons from Great Britain
In developing any kind of comprehensive legislative policy to
deal with the problems of plant closures, it is helpful to look at other
countries which have already tried a similar approach. One such
country is Great Britain. Due to the substantial similarity between
the British and American legal systems, an examination of the British
19. As described in Business Week, a "social contract" is broadly defined as "creating a
new sense of teamwork," not necessarily something put on paper, but an unwritten under-
standing and/or agreement between sectors of society which underlies societal relationships.
Specifically, as asserted in the magazine:
The most urgent piece of business facing the nation is to reverse the economic and
social attitudes that have generated its industrial decline. It is a task that must in-
volve all elements of society: business, labor, government, minorities, and public-
interest groups. It requires nothing less than a new social consensus . . . . Stated
plainly, all social groups in the U.S. today must come to understand that their com-
mon interest in returning the country to a path of strong economic growth overrides
other conflicting interests. The adversary relationships of the past were tolerable
because they centered mostly on how to distribute an expanding output of goods and
services. Taking growth for granted is no longer possible. If the country tries to
pretend otherwise, further economic decline and social disruption are inevitable as
various groups struggle for more and more of less and less.
Revitalizing the U.S. Economy, Bus. WK., June 30, 1980, at 86.
20. Simply put, it is this author's contention that a new sense of teamwork, rather than
confrontation, must be utilized when addressing causes and effects of plant closures.
21. Millspaugh, supra note 1, at 304-05.
22. Id. Interestingly enough, some would argue that the lack of enough employer input
might be the result of a purposeful lack of participation by the business sector. For example,
according to Representative Augustus F. Hawkins, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Employment Opportunities, in his opening remarks at a hearing on plant closure legislation,
the business sector may opt not to participate at all: "We had hoped to receive testimony
today from the business community as well. They were invited to testify. Unfortunately, we
were not successful in our attempts to include them today." National Employment Priorities
Act, 1984: Hearings on H.R. 2847 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
N.E.P.A. 1984].
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legal response to plant closures provides an excellent opportunity to
evaluate the possible effects of such a response if it were to be applied
in the United States.23 An examination of the British laws, proposed
and enacted, relating to plant closing problems may also reveal possi-
ble models or approaches that can be used in the United States.
II. THE BRITISH APPROACH
A. Enacted Legislation
Although the British government has been directly involved in
many areas of the nation's economy following World War 11,24 a
traditional British attitude of non-intervention in the employer-em-
ployee relationship persisted into the early 1960's.25 In 1963, however,
the English Parliament passed the Contracts of Employment Act,
26
which was a major break with the principle of laissez-faire.27 For the
first time a legal obligation was imposed upon employers to give ad-
vance notice to workers who would be dismissed. 28
Following the Contracts of Employment Act, Parliament became
23. Ognibene, Plant Closings and the Duty to Consult Under Britain's Employment Pro-
tection Act of 1975: Lessons for the United States, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 195 (1982).
Mr. Ognibene's article focuses primarily upon the 1975 Employment Protection Act, analyz-
ing specific provisions pertaining to plant closures. This Comment, on the other hand, at-
tempts to compare British legislation such as the 1975 Employment Protection Act with
proposed American legislation addressing plant shutdowns, as well as both countries' general
approaches to this problem.
24. For example, the nationalization of industries such as British Leyland Automotives,
the British Steel Corporation, the National Coal Board, and the Central Electricity Generating
Board. See generally R. CAVES & L. KRAUSE, BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1980);
P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, LABOUR LAW (1979); G. DORFMAN, GOVERNMENT VERSUS
TRADE UNIONISM IN BRITISH POLITICS SINCE 1968 (1979).
25. A. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE POWER 112 (1965). Writing in 1965, Economist Andrew Shonfield described the
prevalent attitude in Britain at the time:
The line taken by the British courts is that the relationship between employer and
employee is on exactly the same footing as that between a willing buyer and a willing
seller of any other service. No one, for instance, can tell an employer that he has
dismissed a worker without just cause and must reinstate him or at least pay him
damages. The most that a British worker can obtain if he is summarily dismissed is
the amount of pay which he would have earned if he had been given the full period of
notice agreed for the job on which he was engaged.
Id.
26. Contract of Employment Act, 1963.
27. A. SHONFIELD, supra note 25, at 113.
28. Id. As stated by Shonfield: "Thus for the first time the British law recognized the
existence of a special right generated by doing a job over a certain period .... " Id.
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even more involved with the problem of "redundancies, ' 29 the British
term for layoffs or terminations of employment, particularly with the
passage of the Redundancy Payments Act of 196530 (1965 Act), and
the Employment Protection Act of 197531 (1975 Act). This trend of
increased legislative intervention in employer-employee relationships
is perhaps reflective of the general British public sentiment concerning
an employer's social responsibilities and an employee's right to
work. 32 The British public tends to believe that a person's right to
work should be nearly equal to the right to own property.33 British
courts have often protected the right to work and have gone so far as
to hold that employers have a legal duty to provide an employee with
work.34 In accordance with the judiciary, the 1965 and 1975 Acts
recognize that an employee's right to work is extremely important not
only to the employee, but to the economy as well.
35
The main features of both the 1965 and 1975 Acts can be divided
into two categories: procedural and substantive rights to the em-
ployee.36 By granting certain procedural rights to employees, Parlia-
ment sought to promote consultation between employers and unions
to determine whether there might be any possible alternatives to
29. According to the Employment Protection Act of 1975, the term redundancy, in rela-
tion to an employee, refers to:
(a) the fact that the employer has ceased, or intends to cease to carry on the business
for the purposes of which the employee is or was employed by him or has ceased, or
intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee is or was
so employed, or
(b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of
a particular kind, or for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place
where he is or was so employed, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease
or diminish.
Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 126(6).
30. Redundancy Payments Act, 1965.
31. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71.
32. Ognibene, supra note 23, at 203.
33. Id. at 203-04.
34. Id. (citing Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Great Britain, [1952] 2 Q.B. 329).
35. Ognibene, supra note 23, at 204. It should be noted that the 1965 Act and particu-
larly 1975 Act were designed not only to provide some specific protections for workers, but
also were components of a broader Labour Party policy to attack Britain's economic woes.
For example, during the parliamentary debate concerning the 1975 Act, the Minister introduc-
ing the bill stated that the Act was "the clearest possible evidence of the Government's com-
mitment to the social contract, which in our view remains the only realistic policy for
containing inflation." Thomson, The British Labor Government's Industrial Relations Program,
9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 159, 176 (1976) (quoting statement of M.P. Hansard (Parliamentary
Debates) Apr. 28, 1975, at cols. 46-47).
36. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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either dismissing employees or shutting down a plant. 37 These proce-
dures require the employer, who is considering a layoff, to report the
reasons for any possible employee dismissals to the Department of
Employment and to the trade unions. 38 This procedural requirement
is meant to facilitate a comprehensive search for all possible alterna-
tives to a complete closure.
39
Under Section 99 of the 1975 Act, employers are required to give
thirty days notice to their employees' unions if ten to ninety-nine
workers are to be dismissed, and ninety days notice if a hundred or
more employees are to be dismissed. 40 During the waiting period after
notice and before dismissal, workers are given paid time off to look for
work elsewhere, including relocation benefits such as travel and hous-
ing.41 Additionally, during this time, the Department of Employment
can set up a variety of retraining programs to assist workers in finding
new jobs.4
2
If proper notice is not given, the union of those workers who may
lose their jobs is entitled to bring the employer before an industrial
rights tribunal to obtain a protective award for lost benefits and pay.
4 3
Moreover, if the company fails to provide the proper notification, stiff
fines and penalties may be imposed.44
In cases where special circumstances are present (e.g., bank-
ruptcy), which make pre-dismissal notification impractical, section
99(8) of the 1975 Act provides an "escape clause" which modifies the
requirements stated above.45 Even in these cases where special cir-
cumstances exist, however, the government pays the displaced work-
ers their wages for the lost period of notice, an amount which is
37. Ognibene, supra note 23, at 211 (citing 891 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 36 (1975)).
The Acts, particularly the 1975 Act, achieve their primary purpose when consultations be-
tween the parties occur. Id. at 212.
38. Massachusetts Report, supra note 5, at 95.
39. Id.
40. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 99(3) (a)-(b).
41. Id. § 61.
42. Id. § 101(1).
43. Joint Report of Labor Union Study Tour Participants, Economic Dislocation: Plant
Closings, Plant Relocations and Plant Conversion 28 (1979) (construing the Employment Pro-
tection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 99) [hereinafter cited as Joint Report].
44. Id. For example, rebates on severance pay which employers normally receive from a
government administered, employer funded redundancy fund may be withheld. Id.
45. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 99(8). Specifically, section 99(8) states:
"If in any case there are special circumstances which render it not reasonably practicable for
the employer to comply with any of the requirements of subsections (3), (5), or (7) above, the
employer shall take all such steps towards compliance with that requirement as are reasonably
practicable at the time." Id.
1986]
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ultimately recouped from the company if at all possible.46
The employee's substantive rights entitle him or her to certain
benefits including compensation, regardless of any external factors
such as a bankruptcy.47 If the business cannot make the payments
(e.g., severance pay, relocation costs, and retraining expenses), the
government guarantees payments from a redundancy fund,48 often to
be reimbursed whenever possible by the failing company.49 Thus, as
stated by one writer, "while these rights do not solely address the
problem of shutdown, they do benefit the employee who is subject to
dismissal."50
Every worker who has worked for two or more years is eligible
for a lump-sum severance compensation. 51 The employer pays the
severance directly to the employee, and it is in addition to other un-
employment payments available for displaced workers. 52 The purpose
of the severance compensation, called the redundancy pay program, is
to provide funds to permanently laid-off employees.
53
An American Labor Union study on plant closings stated that
the British program represents recognition that businesses must some-
times shut down inefficient plants.54 As described by the study, the
British program
reflects the recognition that workers who sustain permanent job
loss were not adequately assisted by the unemployment compensa-
tion system. That system is oriented toward tiding people over
46. Joint Report, supra note 43, at 28.
47. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 63.
48. The Redundancy Fund is supported by employer payments. Redundancy Payments
Act, 1965, ch. 62.
49. Joint Report, supra note 43, at 28.
50. Ognibene, supra note 23, at 206.
51. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, §§ 22-28. For every year of employment
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, an employee gets one-half week's pay, for every
year between twenty-one and sixty-four, one and one-half week's pay. Id.
52. Joint Report, supra note 43, at 27. Although the employer directly pays the sever-
ance pay to the employee, up to forty-one percent of the amount paid typically can be recov-
ered by the company from a national insurance fund administered by the Ministry of Labor.
Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. This report resulted from a tour of three countries-Sweden, West Germany and
the United Kingdom-by a delegation of North American trade unionists from the United
Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers of America, and the International Association
of Machinists. The delegation studied the three countries' politics and practices regarding
economic dislocations, with the purpose of finding "out how these policies and programs actu-




temporary layoffs due to cyclical market conditions, not readjust-
ment to plant shutdown or other permanent employment
cutbacks.
5"
B. The Path Since 1975
The significance of Britain's economic problems has been docu-
mented and debated for many years.5 6 An important factor in both
Britain's economic performance and the success of its two primary
political parties is the relationship between the trade unions and the
government.57 In 1974, the Labour Party defeated the incumbent
Conservative Party primarily because the Labour Party and the trade
unions "negotiated a Social Contract designed to bolster union pow-
ers in return for zero levels of union disruption of the British econ-
omy." s5 8 In fact, Labour won the 1974 election particularly because it
claimed to be better equipped to obtain the cooperation of the trade
unions.59
Despite its legislative output relating to the conditions of employ-
ment, the Labour Party's credibility was shattered by the 1978-79
"Winter of Discontent," one of the worst strike periods in recent Brit-
ish history. 6° As a result, campaigning on a platform of economic
reform (especially in the area of industrial relations), the Conservative
55. Joint Report, supra note 43, at 27.
56. G. DORFMAN, supra note 24, at 1-2. Succinctly described by Mr. Dorfman:
The problem at its simplest is that Britain suffers from being a very populous nation
with a relatively high standard of living which consumes more foreign goods than it
can afford. Lack of domestic raw materials, an antiquated industrial base, the rise of
more modern, aggressive foreign competitors all contribute to the problem.
Id.
57. Id. at 2.
58. INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, TRADE UNIONS: PUBLIC GOODS OR PUBLIC
'BADS'? 92 (1978).
59. Crewe, Why the Conservatives Won, in BRITAIN AT THE POLLS, 1979 266 (R. Penni-
man ed. 1981). According to Crewe, the Labour Party's claim that it could cooperate with the
trade unions seemed quite legitimate until late 1978. As illustrated by Crewe:
[i]ndustrial relations under Edward Heath's Conservative Government of 1970-74
had deteriorated badly, culminating in the miners' strike and February 1974 election
itself, whereas between July 1975 and October 1978 the Labour Government's "so-
cial contract" with the trade unions had secured a considerable reduction in indus-
trial stoppages . . . .[B]ut the winters' strikes destroyed the Labour Party's slowly
accumulated credibility as the only party to handle industrial relations.
Id. at 266-67.
60. King, Politics, Economics, and the Trade Unions, 1974-1979, in BRITAIN AT THE
POLLS, 1979 82 (R. Penniman ed. 1981). Demanding wage increases-while the Labour Gov-
ernment sought to restrain such increases--one group of workers struck after another, not
only paralyzing the entire nation, but also completely undermining any credibility in the La-
bour Party's claim that they could cooperate with the unions. Id. Significantly, the wave of
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Party led by Margaret Thatcher defeated the Labour Party in the
1979 election.61
While the Thatcher Administration did not come into power
with a single coherent policy of relations with British unions, the gov-
ernment has passed two legislative measures-the Employment Acts
of 1980 and 1982-intended as industrial relations reform. 62
Although directed against the unions, the two acts were "politically
cosmetic rather than fundamentally damaging to trade union inter-
ests."' 63 Importantly, however, the 1975 Employment Protection Act
(sections 99-107) remains the sole source of compulsory consultations
over redundancies, thus far untouched by the Thatcher government. 64
Although statistical data concerning the effects of the redun-
dancy provisions of the 1975 Act appears to be scanty, one study of
British employers indicated that the majority of those surveyed felt
that the provisions had little or no effect upon their behavior other
than requiring them to notify and consult with the affected unions
about a possible closure.65 Although this study suggests that employ-
ers do oppose certain substantive rights granted to workers, they do
not seem overly distraught about the obligatory pre-dismissal notifica-
tion and consultation requirements.
66
Finally, employers have benefitted by the "escape clause" 67 in the
1975 Act, particularly during the 1979 to 1981 economic recession
which caused countless companies to go out of business. 68 Although
there is no comprehensive Parliamentary plan relating to plant clo-
industrial unrest was seen night after night by the public on television, a major contributing
factor to the 1979 Conservative electoral triumph. Id.
61. See generally BRITAIN AT THE POLLS, 1979 (R. Penniman ed. 1981).
62. Soskice, Industrial Relations and the British Economy, 1979-1983, 23 INDUST. REL.
306, 313 (1984). The 1980 Act provided for secret ballots on strike and election votes (rather
than the previous "show of hands" practice), limited picketing to six people, and mandated
that new closed shops must have eighty percent support of the workers involved. Id. at 313-
14. The 1982 Act made unions liable for illegal acts performed by union representatives, made
commercial contracts requiring the use of union labor illegal, and extended compensation to
employees dismissed due to closed shops. Id.
63. Id. at 313.
64. Bowers, Handling Redundancies: The Employer's Defense, 5 COMPANY LAW. 137
(1984).
65. Bosworth & Dawkins, Female Patterns of Work and Associated Remuneration Facili-
ties & Opportunities, in RESEARCH REPORT TO THE EEOC-SSRE JOINT PANEL 221 (1979).
66. Id.
67. See supra note 45.
68. Interview with Angus MacKay, Public Affairs Officer with the British Consulate-
General, in Los Angeles (Apr. 18, 1985). Unfortunately, precise statistical data was unavaila-
ble at this time.
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sures, it appears that both employers and employees have utilized the
statutory framework established to deal with redundancies. More-
over, the impact of this legislation upon the economy as a whole
seems to be minute, since the British economic decline has resulted
mainly from historical and economic factors much larger in scope
than the issues and rights addressed in this Comment.
69
III. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH
Before the early to mid-1970's, the issue of plant closures was not
prominent.70 The public grew more aware of the issue as the Ameri-
can economy declined and as adversely affected constituencies voiced
their concerns. 71 This economic decline manifested itself most clearly
in the heightened number of actual plant shutdowns and employee
layoffs, and as a result, the question of what to do about plant closings
has become a significant area of debate. Through increased public
awareness and the efforts of organized labor, a number of federal leg-
islative measures have been offered to deal with the problem. 72 How-
ever, none of the proposed bills has been passed into law.
The American approach to the economy as a whole, and to de-
clining industries and plant closures in particular, has been one of ad
hoc plans and proposals rather than the comprehensive, coordinated,
and consolidated effort seen in other industrialized countries. 73 In the
specific area of plant closings, one could say that the United States has
taken the most "hands-oft" approach toward a problem that all west-
69. See supra note 56.
70. Millspaugh, supra note 1, at 291. In the United States, various elements of organized
labor began to get actively involved in the plant closure issue during the early 1970's. Id.
"Since then, with labor in the lead, an alliance of interested constituencies has been organized
to undertake a major effort to translate concern with the dislocation effects on plant closings
into national policy through the law." Id. at 291-92.
71. Id.
72. See generally Millspaugh, supra note 1. Professor Millspaugh provides a descriptive
analysis of various plant closure proposals at the state and federal levels.
73. For example, one author described the differences in approach this way:
U.S. business is by now familiar with the dominant European and Japanese ap-
proach-a partnership, or at least close cooperation between business and govern-
ment. These partnerships often include, besides business and government,
representatives of labor and special interest groups who work to resolve problems
and to build a consensus . . . . In the United States, the situation is far different.
Most U.S. corporations . . . limit their approval to legislation that will liberalize
depreciation or otherwise provide a tax or other near-term financial advantage for a
corporation.
Public Policy, supra note 18, at 57 (article written by J. Ronald Fox).
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ern industrialized nations are experiencing7 4
Currently, the only significant federal law that applies to plant
closure situations is the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.),
enacted in 1935. 75 In enacting the N.L.R.A., however, Congress did
not intend to deal with displaced workers. Rather, the purpose of the
N.L.R.A. was to require collective bargaining in order to promote
industrial peace and protect the free flow of interstate commerce.
76
Thus, under the N.L.R.A., an employer may not refuse to bargain
collectively with employees concerning wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment. 77 Even though workers have the right
to bargain over those terms and conditions, management still makes
the final decision.78 Therefore, "[t]he duty to bargain imposes not a
duty to agree, but only to negotiate in good faith before implementing
a shutdown.
' '7 9
The first comprehensive federal proposal was the 1974 National
Employment Priorities Act (H.R. 1354 1).80 The measure focused on
74. Ognibene, supra note 23, at 195. This author analyzed the American approach as
compared to that of Great Britain:
Unlike other modern industrial nations, the United States takes a passive approach
which allows employers alone to decide if, when, and how to shut down plants.
Those who are most affected by the shutdown, the employees, frequently have no
input in the shutdown decision. Great Britain, on the other hand, takes a more ac-
tive approach by requiring employers to consult their employees before dismissing
them and by giving employees significant rights upon dismissal.
Id. It should be noted that those who oppose plant closure legislation find the American
approach thus far to be exemplary; particular economic problems are dealt with adequately by
the marketplace and the current, albeit limited, government infrastructure. Winch, Industrial
Policy: An Overview 3 (Dec. 4, 1980) (Congressional Research Service Report No. 80-221E.
Available from the Library of Congress).
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
76. Id. The Congressional intent was explicitly stated in the N.L.R.A.'s opening
declaration:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interrup-
tion, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or
other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
29 U.S.C. § 151.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
78. Massachusetts Report, supra note 5, at 68-69.
79. Id. The National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B.) is the administrative body set up
by the N.L.R.A. to decide on labor management disputes, with the federal courts having juris-
diction to review the N.L.R.B.'s decision. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156.
80. H.R. 13541, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives by William D. Ford of Michigan.
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"arbitrary and unnecessary closings and transfers . . .[which] cause
irreparable social and economic harm to employees, local communi-
ties and the nation."' 81 The specific features included:
(1) creation of the National Employment Relocation Adminis-
tration to investigate and make a finding on whether a partic-
ular closing was justified or not;
82
(2) penalties if the closing is unjustifiable in the form of loss of
various federal tax benefits available to employers;
83
(3) a comprehensive program of federal financial aid to
employees;8
4
(4) federal financial aid to communities affected by plant
closings;8 5
(5) a two-year notification requirement when plants are slated
for closings.
86
In 1979, two bills were introduced, one in the Senate (S. 1608)87
and one in the House of Representatives (H.R. 5040).88 The latter is a
revised version of the unsuccessful 1974 bill. Labeled the National
Employment Priorities Act of 1979, the bill required employer financ-
ing of the benefits to displaced workers program rather than federal
financing as in the 1974 bill. It also limited these funds to fifty-two
weeks except where older workers chose to retire. 89 The 1979 Act
(referred to as the Ford-Riegle bill) would have only applied to busi-
nesses earning $250,000 or more a year.90 If a firm employed 500 or
more workers, a two year pre-dismissal notification of closing would
have been required; if 100 to 499 workers were employed, eighteen
months notice was required; if less than 100 workers, six months no-
tice.9 1 Workers would have been entitled to severance pay of eighty-
five percent of their annual wages, and communities would receive
eighty-five percent of lost tax revenues from businesses. 92 Also, like
the 1974 bill, an administrative body to investigate potential shut-
81. H.R. 13541, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
82. Id. § 2201.
83. Id. § 2701.
84. Id. § 2401.
85. Id. § 2502.
86. Id. § 2301.
87. S. 1608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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downs would have been established. 93 In the same year, the Employee
Protection and Community Stabilization Act of 1979 (S. 1609) was
introduced into the Senate. 94 This bill sought to protect communities
by helping to facilitate economic adjustments within the community if
necessary. 95 Specifically, the bill provided for relocation expenses for
workers to be paid by employers, federal funds to aid troubled busi-
nesses, and the continuation of employee health and welfare benefit
plans beyond their scheduled limits. 96 Furthermore, if an employer
had fifty workers or more, one year notice of an impending closure
would have been required. 97
The Employment Maintenance Act of 1980 (S. 2400) was a less
sweeping measure than the 1974 or 1979 bills. For example, only cor-
porations with assets of $100 million or more would be subject to the
bill's provisions. 98 Two years notice would have been required if an
employer planned on making a change that would cause fifteen per-
cent of the company's labor force to lose their jobs.99 Moreover, only
businesses with assets over $250 million would have to provide any
severance payments to displaced workers. 00
In 1984, legislation concerning plant closures was again intro-
duced under a familiar name-The National Employment Priorities
Act (H.R. 2847).101 The main features of the bill include: prevention
of plant shutdowns through federal financial assistance to businesses,
communities and workers; federal assistance to displaced workers
subsequent to a closure (e.g., relocation costs); notification require-
93. Id. The administrative body would have been under the auspices of the Department
of Labor.
94. S. 1609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
95. Id. The bill contained provisions concerning pre-dismissal notification as well as fi-
nancial assistance to employees who are or will be displaced as a result of a shutdown. Id.
96. Massachusetts Report, supra note 5, at 88.
97. Id.
98. S. 2400, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
99. Massachusetts Report, supra note 5, at 89.
100. Id.
101. Essentially, the bill contains the same provisions, with some modifications, as many
of the earlier bills. As stated in the N.E.P.A. 1984's declarations: "It is the purpose of this
Act to prevent or minimize the harmful economic and social effects of unemployment on em-
ployees and on local governments caused when business concerns undertake changes of opera-
tions." H.R. 2847, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). As of this writing, this bill has not passed
through Congress. However, according to Rep. Augustus Hawkins, in the absence of any
federal legislation such as H.R. 2847, the problem of plant closures should increase: "It seems
to me that if we continue to adhere to the President's economic policies, we will insure the
continuation of record numbers of business failures, plant closings, and massive layoffs."
N.E.P.A. 1984, supra note 22, at 1.
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ments before closing and before major layoffs (i.e., ranging from six
months to a year); and mandatory retraining provisions for all dislo-
cated workers. 102
IV. UNITED STATES - GREAT BRITAIN COMPARISON
A. Difference in Legislative Output
Two important distinctions help explain England's more active
response in dealing with the problems of plant closures. One, the
British Labour Party takes a more active role in solving labor
problems than the American Democratic Party. Two, there is a more
cooperative government-business relationship in Britain in contrast to
the more adversarial nature of government-business relations in the
United States.
British labor unions enjoy a close and symbiotic relationship with
the political Labour Party. The Labour Party, formed in 1906 from
an alliance of numerous unions and socialist organizations, relies tre-
mendously upon the union movement for its financial support. 10 3 It
has even been suggested that the British unions have their own polit-
ical party. 0 4 The Trades Union Congress (TUC), the British
equivalent of the American AFL-CIO, 10 5 represents ninety-three per-
cent of all unionized workers in England. 10 6 The Labour Party de-
pends largely on TUC financial contributions, and the TUC
frequently sponsors Labour Party candidates for Parliament. 107 As a
result of this reliance upon the union movement for support, British
102. Hearings-Los Angeles, supra note 10, at 2. Although there is no guarantee of a job for
a laid-off worker, many feel the job retraining provision may be the most important component
of any plant closing legislation. For example, as stated by Rep. Hawkins, the retraining re-
quirement is quite "important because many thousands of jobs in certain industries have been
eliminated and the workers who performed these tasks must be transitioned into other indus-
tries." Id.
103. Lowry, Bartlett & Heinsz, Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations in the United




106. COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 143 (R. Blanpain ed.
1982). According to statistics listed in this book, approximately fifty-five percent of all em-
ployees in England are union members. Id.
107. Id. In fact, the TUC designed and developed the idea of the "social contract," a
policy promoting cooperation between trade unions and government to overcome economic
problems. The Labour Party, particularly during the early to mid-1970's, adopted the TUC
"social contract" approach and, when in government, adopted legislation incorporating this
cooperative formula (e.g., Employment Protection Act, 1975). G. DORFMAN, supra note 24,
at 106-16.
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unions have the ability to impose direct pressure on the Labour Party.
This pressure is particularly effective when the Labour Party is in
power. 10
8
Unions in the United States, on the other hand, do not have a
party they can call their own. 109 Although historically the Demo-
cratic Party has represented labor unions, that Party's power base
consists of a coalition of interest groups. 110 The Democratic Party,
therefore, has its attention and loyalty split between many different
groups and is unable to concentrate on the interests of any one group.
Hence, it is not surprising that in Britain where one political party has
labor as its primary constituency there has been more legislation en-
acted to protect the interests of labor in the event of plant closures.
The second distinction, which helps explain the difference in leg-
islative production, is the nature of government-business relations in
each country. While a traditional British governmental policy of non-
intervention in employer-employee relationships persisted into the
1960's, government and industry had cooperated with one another to
some degree. For example, before World War I, the British Board of
Trade encouraged government participation in an enterprise which
later became British Petroleum;"' and, following World War I, the
British government sponsored a giant merger that became Imperial
Chemical Industries. 1 2
In the United States, however, "[flor more than 100 years, com-
panies and government agencies have repeatedly confronted each
other as adversaries, not as working partners. '" 13 During the 1970's,
the highly adversarial interface between industry and government in-
tensified showing "how deeply institutionalized the barriers to collab-
oration have become."' 1 4 Unfortunately, numerous business leaders
believe that the future of this relationship will more than likely mimic
the past, with little expectation of dramatic changes. 15
108. Lowry, supra note 103, at 22.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Public Policy, supra note 18, at 9.
112. Id.
113. Id. at iv. Historian Alfred Chandler gave one explanation for the adversarial nature
of American business-government relations: "In the United States, business hierarchies ap-
peared before public ones. In Europe, the reverse was true." Id. at 9. Therefore, when the
governmental agencies accumulated power and began regulating businesses, a natural conflict
arose between the two entities. Id. at iv.
114. Id. at iv-v.
115. Id. at v.
294 [Vol. 8:277
Plant Closure Legislation
B. Enacted British Laws vs. Proposed United States Laws1 16
With slight variations, all American Federal proposals concern-
ing plant closures have included provisions similar to those in the
British 1975 Act, such as pre-dismissal notification requirements, sev-
erance payments, relocation expenses and job retraining opportuni-
ties. Nevertheless, not one of the bills has successfully passed through
Congress, principally because of strong opposition by American
businesses. 117
The arguments usually articulated by critics of federal plant clos-
ing laws can be stated as three propositions. First, capital mobility is
the key to economic liberty, a central part of a free-market economy
and a free society. Thus, allowing businesses to determine when,
where, and why they should relocate prevents the concentration of
economic power in government. 1 8 Second, restrictive legislation is
necessarily detrimental to the entire nation because economic condi-
tions in a growing, adaptable economy are always changing. Busi-
nesses must be flexible enough to meet different economic conditions
or the economy as a whole will suffer in the long run. 19 Third, fre-
quently it is not until the last minute that businesses know that they
must close. And, even if marginally profitable businesses are exper-
iencing tight economic situations, they might have reasons for con-
cealing their intentions to shutdown. 120
Proponents of plant closing laws counter by claiming that the
various legislative proposals do not intend to strip away the power to
decide to close a plant down. Rather, the measures seek to make the
relationship between management, labor and government more equi-
table and coordinated. 21 One scholar argues that "the fundamental
issue is not how to stop capital mobility but rather how to ensure that
116. Because the United States has not yet passed any plant closing laws, a comparison
between each country's legislative approach to employee dislocation must necessarily be a
contrast between enacted laws in Britain and proposed laws in the United States.
117. One scholar described business' opposition to the various federal proposals: "To the
extent the alternatives delimit or co-opt management's traditionally exclusive right to shut-
down when economic circumstances so dictate, they will be unacceptable to large segments of
the business community." Millspaugh, Plant Closings and the Prospects for a Judicial Re-
sponse, 8 J. CORP. L. 483, 485 (1983).
118. R. MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 137.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Massachusetts Report, supra note 5, at 63. Reasons to conceal plant closure plans
include preventing the stoppage of orders from customers, preventing a decline in stock value,
and preventing banks and others from ceasing to supply credit. Id.
121. Kay & Griffin, supra note 3, at 210-11.
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the transfer of capital from one location to another will not ride
roughshod over the needs of the people and community involved."'1 22
The same author concedes, however, that an important and difficult
policy question arises because "the danger in attempting to save jobs
is that it may be more inefficient for the economy. Yet, there are
many situations in which profitable branch plants are closed, espe-
cially by large conglomerates."' 123 When a conflict between the rights
of a corporation and the rights of workers arises (e.g., concerning
management's right to relocate capital at will and the employee's
right not to be abruptly terminated), a compromise or modification of
each side's position would seem to be in the best interests of society,
particularly where a profitable plant might be closed.
In the United States, employers alone make the decision to shut
down plants, in effect washing their hands of any social responsibility
by externalizing a business cost and forcing the public sector to
pay. 124 The 1975 British Act, however, passed and implemented in a
legal system similar to the American legal system, established
mandatory governmental guidelines for notification of plant closures
and for obligatory consultations between management, government
and the affected labor force. Whereas a business in the United States
can close a plant for any reason without any non-management input,
the 1975 British Act compels consultations to explore any and all fea-
sible alternatives. 1
25
In order for the solutions to the problems of plant closings to
reflect not only employee interests, but also to preserve the important
interests of management and business, both sides of this traditionally
adversarial duo must begin to cooperate. 126 It is unlikely that this
cooperation will occur without the support of the government. In
122. MacNeil, Plant Closings and Workers' Rights, 14 OTTAWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1982) (cit-
ing B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 3, at ii).
123. MacNeil, supra note 122, at 3 (citing Bluestone & Harrison, 7 WORKING PAPERS FOR
A NEW SOCIETY 15 (No. 3, 1980)).
124. Kay & Griffin, supra note 3, at 209. An example of externalizing a business cost
would be where a company might use machinery at a job site, then abandon the machinery at
the site after completing the particular task, thereby forcing the local government to shoulder
the costs of removing the machinery. By analogy, employers utilize the services of their em-
ployees, then leave them to the community after a plant closure, often necessitating public
assistance to help the displaced workers.
125. If the labor union cannot come up with a practical alternative, or if the plant is going
bankrupt in a hurried fashion, the Employment Protection Act of 1975 allows the employer to
carry through with the plant shutdown. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 99(8).
126. Although mandatory consultations concerning impending plant closures would most
likely be greeted with antagonism, one should recall that the business world was not overjoyed
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fact, initially, the government should enact legislation that will re-
quire the parties to sit down and discuss various options before a plant
closure takes place.'
27
Yet, because of the lack of any United States legislation in the
area of plant closures, 128 the process must be gradual and well
thought out. Interestingly enough, according to a May 1980, Forbes
magazine survey of more than one hundred Fortune 500 companies,
three out of five executives responded that a three month pre-dismis-
sal notification period was quite feasible, with one-third considering a
six month to one year notice period ideal. 129
Therefore, as a starting point, procedural rights such as pre-dis-
missal notification and mandatory consultation should be seriously
considered and enacted as federal law. In fact, the most recently pro-
posed federal legislation on plant closures in the United States pro-
vided such an approach.1 30 The Labor-Management Notification and
Consultation Act of 1985 (H.R. 1616), although also eventually de-
feated, had a more modest objective than prior federal proposals.
1 3'
when forced to collectively bargain with unions. The use of force was required because, as
here, management had all the power.
127. Such a cooperative approach has proven effective in Alabama, where a General Mo-
tors plant scheduled to be shut down was kept open due to the collaborative efforts by the GM
management, the U.A.W., and the University of Alabama. According to a written statement
of the International Union, U.A.W.:
Rather than accept the closure of action as the only course of action, the local union
immediately began working on ways to save the plant. Faced with the loss of jobs,
the community and the University of Alabama. . . also got involved. The net result
was an innovative 3-year tripartite agreement reached in early 1983 between GM, the
U.A.W. and the University of Alabama in which all parties were committed to save
the Tuscaloosa plant from closing.
N.E.P.A. 1984, supra note 22, at 128-29.
128. It should be noted that although no federal bills concerning plant closures have
passed into law, several states have enacted such statutes; the states are Maine, Massachusetts,
South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B(6-A) (West Supp.
1984-1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 182 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984-1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
129. Harrison, The International Movement for Pre-Notification of Plant Closures, 23 IN-
DUS. REL. 387, 403 (1984).
130. H.R. 1616, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). It should be noted that this bill was not
enacted. It was defeated in the House of Representatives on November 21, 1985.
131. According to Rep. William D. Ford, author of H.R.1616:
For many years, I have introduced legislation to enable the federal government to
help prevent plant closings and avoid mass layoffs and to assist businesses, communi-
ties, and workers in the event that such dislocations could not be prevented. ...
Because they were comprehensive in approach and sought to regulate extensively
how businesses conduct closures. . . those bills generated tremendous opposition in
the business community and never received support from Republican Members of
Congress. . . . In light of this history, it has become clear that a new, more politi-
cally viable approach must be taken if any assistance is to be provided to the millions
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Rather than providing numerous substantive rights such as severance
pay, job retraining and relocation expenses, this bill sought "[t]o re-
quire employers to notify and consult with employees before ordering
a plant closing or permanent layoff."
1 32
Specifically, H.R. 1616 would have required employers with fifty
or more employees to notify their workers ninety days in advance of
any plant closing or permanent layoff of fifty or more employees.
133
In addition, the bill would have imposed upon employers the duty to
consult with their employees concerning alternatives to a closure or
layoff during the ninety day notice period. 134 Lastly, and most impor-
tantly in terms of a more balanced approach, the notice requirement
could have been reduced or eliminated entirely if an employer was
unable to provide the notification due to "unavoidable business
circumstances."1
35
Thus, a balanced legislative solution to the problem of plant clo-
sures can be designed to accomodate not only the interests of both
employers and employees, but also the interests of society as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
The business ethos in American society is known to be extremely
hostile to any government intervention in the private economy. 36 In
contrast, while
[flaced with the immediate consequences of various kinds of natu-
ral disasters-floods, fires, earthquakes, tornadoes, and the like-
private citizens in this country, as well as the federal and state gov-
ernments, are capable of prodigies of organization and cooperation
to provide relief for the victims. Unhappily, no comparable efforts
on a similar scale are forthcoming to relieve individuals and com-
munities whose lives are seriously disrupted, even destroyed, by
sudden plant closings or removals.
137
Most societal problems, whether natural or artificial, can be at-
tacked in a constructive and cooperative manner. In Great Britain,
of American workers who lose their jobs in mass layoffs and plant closings every
year.
Ford, supra note 11, at 323.
132. H.R. 1616, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
133. Id. § 3(a).
134. Id. § 4.
135. Id. § 3(b).
136. Aaron, Plant Closings: American and Comparative Perspectives, 59 CHI.-KENT L.




government, business, and labor have tended to work together to not
only pass legislation protecting against abrupt dismissals of workers,
but also to establish a mandatory arena in which the parties must
negotiate and consult with one another. In the United States, how-
ever, an employer like General Electric can unilaterally decide on its
own to shut down even a profitable plant (often to make more profits
elsewhere) at any time, thereby depriving employees and their families
of their livelihoods. Capital mobility should not be so sacrosanct that
the health of individuals, communities, local governments, and other
businesses are but an afterthought in the decision to close down a
plant, especially if the plant turns a profit.
Plant closure legislation enacted in other countries, such as
Great Britain, provide excellent models and suggest several ap-
proaches applicable in the United States. One scholar said: "[w]hat
we can learn is to view our own problems from a new and different
perspective, to ask ourselves what might happen if we were to aban-
don our basic premise that any social measures that impede the mo-
bility of capital are necessarily bad and must, therefore, be
rejected." 138
Considering the free-market, hands-off approach of the current
Reagan Administration in the United States, plus the apparent Amer-
ican economic recovery during the early to mid-1980's, federal legisla-
tive protective measures for workers threatened by plant closures is
not currently a major issue. Nevertheless, the need for such laws will
once again come to the political forefront as the demand for jobs
grows and future technological advances limit employment opportu-
nities. At that time, only through the cooperative efforts of govern-
ment, business and labor can effective legislative remedies be designed
and, more importantly, be enacted by Congress.
Mitchell J. Popham
138. Id. at 964.
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